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Synopsis
The revival of Newman’s (1928) objection to Russell’s Causal Theory of Perception by De-
mopoulous & Friedman (1985) has led to the widespread opinion that Russell’s view was
an early form of Epistemic Structural Realism, against which Newman had provided a
devastating objection. Russell’s letter to Newman soon after is taken to represent his com-
plete capitulation, where, in a “classic Homer Simpson ‘Doh!’ moment” (French, 2014, 73),
he realizes that his structuralist account of theoretical knowledge has been “demolished”
(Linsky, 2013). But if this was really Russell’s understanding then how are we to explain
the “nonchalant response to a devastating criticism” that follows (Linsky, 2013)? Why,
then, did Russell never discuss Newman’s objection in print, while essentially restating
the same theory in later work (Demopoulos & Friedman, 1985)?
To remove this appearance of intellectual dishonesty on Russell’s part, I argue that
Newman only pointed out an ambiguity in the formulation of Russell’s theory of percep-
tion in Analysis of Matter, which was easily remedied. Russell’s letter merely thanks New-
man for pointing out this ambiguity, which was due to his incautious statements to the
effect that “nothing is know about the physical world except its structure” (Russell, 1968,
259), while accepting Newman’s suggested reformulation of his view. This reformulation,
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however, departs from what Russell wrote in Analysis of Matter. Nonetheless, I find there
a plausible formulation of Russell’s view that also avoids Newman’s objection.
The failure of recent scholarship to discern this possibility is due to the conflation of
Russell’s actual views with Grover Maxwell’s later Epistemic Structural Realism which,
although inspired by Russell, is not Russell’s view. This has led recent commentators to
suppose that Russell was committed to the thesis that only abstract structure can be di-
rectly known (Votsis, 2003, 2005). However, Russell had never maintained that we cannot
be directly acquainted with relations—as he later wrote, this view he had “repeatedly re-
pudiated with all possible emphasis” (Russell, 1944, 693)—and Analysis of Matter contains
a list of ‘perceptual relations’ that can be perceived, e.g., temporal precedence, spatial re-
lations, resemblance, simultaneity (Russell, [1927] 1954, 278).1
With this in mind, we see that Russell’s causal theory of perception involves acquain-
tance with a concrete structure, and his formal explication of similarity of structure should
be read as an equivalence relation that holds between two concrete structures, relative to
a perceptual relation (given in intension). Rather than asserting the mere existence of an
abstract structure, a condition that Newman showed to be trivially satisfied when a set of
the same cardinality exists, Russell really meant to assert the existence of an external rela-
tion with the same logical properties as the perceived relation and a set of events ordered
by that external relation in the same way (represented by, e.g., a partially ordered set).
Russell’s theory, then, asserts that there exists a concrete structure with a relation (given
in intension) defined on it such that (i) the relation has the same logical properties as the
perceived relation and (ii) the set is structured by that relation in the same way, i.e., the
two concrete structures instantiate the same abstract structure relative to their respective
logically equivalent relations. This claim suffices to avoid Newman’s triviality objection,
but doesn’t go so far as Newman’s suggestion that the theory be revised so that the same
relation is said to hold in each case.
This interpretation respects Russell’s Doctrine of External Relations (which counts ag-
1The exception that proves the rule: although Demopoulos (2003, 2011) appreciates this aspect of Russell’s
position, by formulating the problem in Maxwell’s terms he fails to see its significance for understanding
Russell’s response to Newman.
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ainst taking relations in extension) and also receives support from his discussion of struc-
tural similarity in his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy ([1919] 1993). It is relevant to
the recent literature on Newman’s objection since, although it has often been suggested
that taking relations in intension would suffice to avoid Newman’s problem (by, e.g.,
Hochberg, 1994), there is no precise formulation of a structural realism that does so. There
is also relevance for the continuing debate among structural realists concerning the rela-
tive merits of Ontic and Epistemic Structural Realisms. Perhaps surprisingly, my account
of Russell’s relational realism more closely resembles contemporary Ontic Structural Re-
alisms, although Russell avoids objections concerning the incoherence of positing relations
without relata. Russell’s attempted reconstruction of space-time in relational terms also
bears a close resemblance to the space-time structuralism considered by Wu¨thrich (2012).
This resemblance is not accidental: Russell’s Analysis of Matter contains an important—
and, in some ways, more sophisticated—antecedent of this structuralist understanding of
space-time.
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1 Introduction
Russell’s Causal Theory of Perception is laid out in Chapter 20 of Analysis of Matter (AMa)
([1927] 1954) and can be summarized as follows. In the event ontology of AMa, a perceiv-
ing subject is to be identified with a family of inter-related events forming a biography, i.e.,
the history of a mind. Some of these events are percepts, which are richly structured due
to the causal relationships they bear to external stimuli, e.g., tables. We are not directly
acquainted with the groups of events from which Russell would construct external objects
like tables, but we are acquainted with the relations that order our percepts and so struc-
ture our experience. The structure that these percepts bear in virtue of being ordered by
these relations is mirrored in the structure of the external events that caused them, in the
sense that the external events are structured in a logically equivalent manner.
The problem with this last claim, applied to some definite set of percepts, is that it is
ambiguous between:
S1 If a set of percepts P instantiates a structure S then the set of external events E instanti-
ates an isomorphic structure S′ (i.e., they are structures with the same relation-number).
S2 If a set of percepts P is ordered by a perceived relation R then the set of external events
E is ordered in the same way by a relation R′ having the same logical properties as R.
This ambiguity is the focus of Newman’s (1928) paper, who supports the first reading
by quoting an incautious remark of Russell’s that “wherever we infer from perceptions
it is only structure that we can validly infer; and structure is what can be expressed by
mathematical logic” (254). But, as Newman points out, the first conditional (S1) is trivially
satisfied when E and P have the same cardinality. This cannot suffice to explicate the
required notion of shared structure that would support meaningful inferences about the
complex causes of percepts. However, Newman acknowledges that something like S2 is
non-trivial:
A point to be emphasised is that it is meaningless to speak of the structure of
a mere collection of things, not provided with a set of relations—e.g., of a set
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of dots not connected by any lines. Further, no important information about
the aggregate A, except its cardinal number, is contained in the statement that
there exists a system of relations, with A as field, whose structure is an assigned
one. For given any aggregate A, a system of relations between its members can
be found having any assigned structure compatible with the cardinal number
of A. Thus the only important statements about structure are those concerned
with the structure set up in A by a given, definite, relation. (Newman, 1928,
140)
The distinction that Newman draws our attention to here has to do with the differing stan-
dards of similarity of structure for two sets with a relation defined on them and, e.g., two
sets partially ordered by a binary relation (i.e., two posets), a distinction that also applies
to S1 and S2. In the first case, isomorphism suffices; in the case of two posets, however, we
require an order homomorphism, i.e., an order-preserving bijection. However, rather than
consider S2, Newman apparently presents a third, logically stronger, alternative:
S3 If a set of percepts P is ordered by a perceived relation R then the set of external events
E is ordered in the same way by the same relation R.
This is evidently stronger than S2, which could be satisfied by two empirically distinct
relations (given in intension).
2 Russell’s Response
It seems clear that Russell could be interpreted as holding either S1 or S2 in AMa, but not
S3. So when Russell writes to Newman that “I had not really intended to say what in fact
I did say, that nothing is known about the physical world except its structure” (Russell,
1968, 259) he could be interpreted as merely saying that he regretted making statements
that could be taken to assert S1 rather than S2. However, Russell follows this sentence with
remarks that could be taken to endorse S3, choosing co-punctuality—a relation central to
his attempted construction of space-time in AMa—as an example:
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I had always assumed spacio-temporal continuity with the world of percepts,
that is to say, I had assumed that there might be co-punctuality between per-
cepts and non-percepts, and even that one could pass by a finite number of
steps from one event to another compresent with it, from one end of the uni-
verse to the other. And co-punctuality I regarded as a relation which might
exist among percepts and is itself perceptible. (Russell, 1968, 260)
In fact, this idea is also Newman’s, and he regards it is a plausible interpretation of AMa
that Russell had intended to propose that such a relation is directly perceived (Newman,
1928, 148).
But what exactly does Russell commit himself to in AMa? Instead of a precise statement
of the relation of ‘similarity’ for systems of relations (i.e. concrete structures—as the current
literature on Newman’s objection would lead one to expect) what we find is an account of
similar relations:
Take, e.g.: “Before is a transitive relation.” This is not a statement which pure
logic can enunciate, because before is an empirical relation. But “R is a transi-
tive relation, where R is a variable, can be enunciated by pure logic. . . . It will
be seen that transitiveness, e.g., is a logical property of a relation; so is asym-
metry or symmetry . . . We can now state the proposition on account of which
structure is important:
When two relations have the same structure (or relation-number), all their logical prop-
erties are identical. (Russell, [1927] 1954, 251)
Call this RC, for Russell’s Criterion. This is intended as a criterion of equivalence for
relations, understood in intension. This criterion, applied to percepts, is what Votsis (2005)
calls the:
Mirroring Relations Principle (MR). Relations between percepts mirror (i.e.,
have the same logico-mathematical properties as) relations between their non-
perceptual causes. (Votsis, 2005, 1362)
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Votsis regards this principle as underwriting Russell’s assumption of structural similarity,
In Russell’s presentation, however, this principle follows from the assumption that complex
effects share structure with their complex causes; it does not imply it.2
Given Russell’s frequent assertions to the effect that relations such as ‘before’ can be
perceived, it seems that Votsis errs in saying that “Russell claims that we can at most know
the second-order structure of physical relations but not the relations themselves for we
have no epistemic access to them” (Votsis, 2003, 882). In fact, later in AMa, Russell gives
further examples of the sort of relations between percepts that can be perceived.3
I shall call a relation “perceived” or “perceptual” if the fact that this relation
holds between certain terms can be discovered by mere analysis of percepts.
Thus before-and-after is a perceptual relation, when it occurs between terms
both of which belong to the specious present. Spatial relations within the vi-
sual field are perceptual; so are those between simultaneous tactile sensations
in different parts of the body. . . . There are perceived relations between a per-
cept and a recollection, which leads us to refer the latter to the past. There are
perceived relations of comparison [e.g., resemblance] . . . There is also, I should
say, a perceived relation of simultaneity. I do not suggest the above list is com-
plete, but it indicates the kinds of cases in which relations can be perceived.
(Russell, [1927] 1954, 278)
So Russell regards simultaneity as a perceptual relation in AMa. But, in the event ontol-
ogy interpretation of relativity theory that he presents, the relation of local simultaneity—
the only objective simultaneity relation that relativistic physics supports—is nothing but
co-punctuality, i.e., overlap of events. So Russell was already committed to the idea that
co-punctuality was a perceptible relation (at least, when it holds between percepts). To
claim that these relations must be qualitatively identical in order to escape Newman’s ob-
2See the introduction to this chapter, where Russell writes that he is taking for granted “the assumption of
a certain similarity of structure between cause and effect where both are complex” (Russell, [1927] 1954, 249).
3Assertions like this, made throughout Russell’s career, explain Russell’s apparent astonishment in replying
to Max Black in 1944 that “Mr. Black must suppose me to hold that we cannot be acquainted with relations—a
view which I have repeatedly repudiated with all possible emphasis” (Russell, 1944, 693).
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jection, as does Demopoulos (2003, 414), surely misses the point: what quality could a
non-experienced relation possess that would be relevant to science? And what could pre-
vent relations among percepts from satisfying the definitions of relations that physics takes
to apply to all events, without exception?
That is, when we give a theoretical description of a relation, e.g., ‘temporal precedence,’
we can only give its logical properties. (At least, so claims Russell in AMa.) This provides,
therefore, a definite description satisfied by an entire equivalence class of physical relations
(equivalent under RC). Now suppose that we are able to perceive a relation that behaves
just like temporal precedence, having the same logical properties on the class of events
of which we are directly aware (i.e. percepts). In that case, we are justified in claiming
that the relation we perceive satisfies the theoretical definition, and thus lies in the same
equivalence class as the posited theoretical relation ‘temporal precedence.’
However, referring to a physical relation by description can only pick out an entire
equivalence class of logically equivalent physical relations that are apt to play that the-
oretical role. Since the perceptual relation lies within that equivalence class it is, for all
intents and purposes, the same relation as the theoretical relation. In this respect, the theo-
retical description behaves as if it picked out a universal that is instantiated as a perceptual
relation. Nonetheless, the perceptual relation is not identical with the theoretical relation,
it merely satisfies the corresponding description. In this sense, Russell’s response to New-
man is consistent with him having maintained S2 rather than S3. And S2 is sufficient to
avoid Newman’s objection, as I now explain.
3 Understanding this Response
The key point is that Russell’s claim of direct acquaintance with perceptual relations allows
us to suppose that we have empirical access to concrete structures and the relations that
structure them (rather than abstract structures) and this allows us to pick out an equiva-
lence class of structurally similar concrete structures—i.e., sets structured by a specified
relation—in a non-trivial way. The sense in which S2 is stronger than S1, then, is that S1
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only asserts the existence of a set E on which a relation structurally similar to R can be
defined, whereas S2 asserts that there exists a another relation R′ logically equivalent to
R (in the sense of RC) which structures some set E in the same way as R structures P.
Key to this solution is the idea that R and R′ can be given independently of their exten-
sions: in particular, R is known by direct acquaintance and both R and R′ are known to
satisfy a theoretical definition. In that case, S2 asserts that R′ is a physical relation in the
same equivalence class as R and that E is a set structured by R′ in the same way that R
structures P. Here’s a more precise expression of RC that captures this idea.
Definition 1. Let A and B be two n-term relations and let 〈RA, S〉, 〈RB, S′〉 be two concrete
structures, where RA ⊆ Sn and RB ⊆ S′n contain the n-tuples related by A and B, respectively.
That is:
A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)⇔ (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ RA; B(x′1, x′2, . . . , x′n)⇔ (x′1, x′2, . . . , x′n) ∈ RB.
Then 〈RA, S〉 and 〈RB, S′〉 are structurally similar with respect to A and B if and only if there
exists a bijection f : S→ S′ such that
A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)⇔ B( f (x1), f (x2), . . . , f (xn)) for all x ∈ S.
If there exists an injection f : S→ S′ such that
A(x1, x2, . . . , xn)⇒ B( f (x1), f (x2), . . . , f (xn)) for all x ∈ S,
then 〈RA, S〉 and 〈RB, S′〉 are semi-similar with respect to A and B.
Recall that Newman’s problem arose for S1 because merely claiming the existence of a
system of relations R′ given in extension is a trivial matter: all it requires is the existence of
the set R′ ⊆ P(E) whose inverse image is R ⊆ P(P), and this is guaranteed to exist by the
usual axioms of set theory if E and P have the same cardinality. However, so long as A and
B, relations on E and P respectively, are taken in intension then RB denotes some definite
subset of P(E), and the existence of a map f : P → E such that every ordered n-tuple of
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elements related by A in the domain is mapped to an ordered n-tuple of elements related
by B in the codomain is a non-trivial affair.
Thus defining S2 as follows suffices to avoid Newman’s problem:
S2′ If P is a set of percepts structured by a perceptual relation A then there exists a physical
relation B and a set E such that 〈RA, P〉 and 〈RB, E〉 are structurally (semi-)similar with
respect to A and B.
The supposed unavailability of this option is due to the conflation of Russell’s position
with a Ramsey-sentence form of structural realism, with its attendant distinction between
observational and theoretical vocabulary. Requiring of Russell that he respects this dis-
tinction distorts his view: for Russell, the key distinction is between experienced (i.e., per-
ceptual) and non-experienced relations, interpreted realistically. (Russell assumed objects
to be of a single type: events.)
To see how this allows for a non-trivial claim of structural similarity, consider the exam-
ple of Russell ([1919] 1993), which he illustrates by the diagram in Figure 1. This represents
Figure 1: Russell’s example from Intro. to Math. Phil.
a system of relations RA which we will write in extension as follows:
RA = {〈a, b〉, 〈a, c〉, 〈a, d〉, 〈b, c〉, 〈c, e〉, 〈d, c〉, 〈d, e〉}.
So we have here a concrete structure, 〈RA, P〉, where P = {a, b, c, d, e}. The conflation of A,
a binary relation, with its extension RA, a subset of P× P, will lead to Newman’s problem
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when combined with Russell’s criterion of equivalence for relations (RC).
Russell’s definition requires that there exists a one–one map between P and some other
set Q (i.e., a bijection). This is a necessary condition for a relation on Q to have the same
structure as a relation on P. Newman’s problem relies on the fact that this is also a sufficient
condition for there to exist a relation on Q having the same structure as any given relation
on P.
Now suppose that there exists another set Q = {h, k, l, m, n}. Since P and Q have
the same cardinality, there exists a one–one map between P and Q (or, rather, many such
maps), f : P → Q, say f (a) = h, f (b) = k, etc. For any given map there also exists a set
R′A ⊂ Q×Q such that
R′A = {〈 f (a), f (b)〉, 〈 f (a), f (c)〉, 〈 f (a), f (d)〉, 〈 f (b), f (c)〉, 〈 f (c), f (e)〉,
〈 f (d), f (c)〉, 〈 f (d), f (e)〉}.
In either case, R′A is a relation having the same structure as RA, i.e., forming a concrete
structure 〈R′A, Q〉 such that 〈x, y〉 ∈ RA ⇔ 〈 f (x), f (y)〉 ∈ R′A. In defining this relation,
it sufficed to posit the existence of a set with the same cardinality as P; nothing else was
required.
However, we can use the idea of S2′ to describe the structure of Russell’s simple exam-
ple in a way that doesn’t succumb to Newman’s problem. The diagram that Russell draws
is a directed acyclic graph. Every such graph uniquely determines a partially ordered set
(or poset) where the partial order is given by the relation of ‘reachability’.4 That is, x ≤ y
if and only if there exists a directed path from x to y. So we can describe Russell’s example
as a poset 〈P,≤〉, where we have a ≤ b, a ≤ c, a ≤ d, a ≤ e, b ≤ c, b ≤ e, c ≤ e, d ≤ e. The
extension of ≤ on P is given by a set R≤ ⊂ P× P.
The relevant notion of ‘same structure’ for posets is given by a monotone map, i.e., an
order-preserving bijection. That is, two posets 〈S,≤〉 and 〈S′,≤′〉 have the same structure
4A poset is a set S on which a partial order ≤ is defined, i.e., a pair 〈S,≤〉, where a partial order is a binary
relation that is transitive, asymmetric and reflexive.
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if and only if there exists a function f : S→ S′ such that (i) f is a bijection, and (ii) a ≤ b⇔
f (a) ≤ f (b), for all a, b ∈ S. This is just to say that 〈R≤, S〉 and 〈R≤′ , S′〉 are structurally
similar with respect to ≤ and ≤′. It is easily seen that this is a non-trivial claim. Consider
the example above, where P and Q are sets with cardinality |P| = |Q| = 5, and define the
extension of ≤′ on Q as follows:
R≤′ := {〈h, l〉, 〈k, m〉}.
Since there are fewer pairs related by ≤′ than are related by ≤, there is evidently no injec-
tion f : P→ Q such that x ≤ y⇒ f (x) ≤ f (y) for all x, y ∈ P.
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